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Understanding	Sports	Violence:	Revisiting	Foundational	Explorations	
Within	 this	 paper	 we	 discuss	 the	 importance	 of	 attending	 to	 definitions	 of	 ‘violence’.	 Through	 a	return	 to	 a	 selection	 of	 important	 foundational	 works,	 we	 attempt	 to	 unpack	 the	 fundamental	meanings	of	violence	in	a	general	sense,	and	sport	violence	in	particular.	With	a	specific	focus	on	the	need	for	definitional	clarity,	and	particular	attention	to	the	‘ritual’	dimensions	of	sport	violence,	we	argue	that	engaging	with	these	concepts	is	essential	when	conducting	research	in	‘violent’	contexts.	Based	on	a	critical	reading	of	a	small	selection	of	relatively	recent	scholarship	in	sports	settings,	we	ultimately	 argue	 that	without	 careful	 consideration	 of	what	 can	 constitute	 ‘violence’,	 scholars	 risk	misrepresenting	the	social	worlds	they	investigate.	In	conclusion	we	call	for	researchers	to	enter	into	a	dialogue	with	foundational	explorations	of	violence	and	to	pays	far	greater	heed	to	the	definitions	favoured	by	practitioners	who	engage	with	apparent	‘violence’	on	a	regular	basis. 	Christopher	R.	Matthews	
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	In	the	academic	study	of	sport,	the	term	‘violence’	is	employed	within	various	contexts	to	describe	a	multitude	of	actions,	behaviours	and	phenomena.	Despite	being	a	morally	charged	term	–	and	thus	potentially	politically	active	in	its	employment	–	it	is	a	word	commonly	used	in	scholarly	and	popular	discourse	 in	 an	 implicit	 and	 often	 assumed	 capacity.	 As	 such,	Kimble	et	 al	 (2010,	 460),	 discussing	sports	violence,	suggest,	“this	creates	the	unfortunate	situation	where	an	observed	behaviour	could	be	 correctly	 viewed	 as	 either	 violent	 or	 non-violent”.	 Here,	 the	 term’s	 usefulness	 in	 an	 academic	sense	begins	to	 falter.	 It	 is	crucial	 to	seek	some	level	of	affirmation	over	the	meaning	of	terms	that	are	 regularly	 utilised	 within	 academic	 discourses.	 What	 is	 more,	 such	 a	 problem	 is	 particularly	concerning	here	given	the	clear	implications	that	the	term	‘violence’	has	for	questions	over	the	moral	legitimacy	of	certain	sporting	practices.			With	 this	 in	 mind,	 several	 previous	 attempts	 have	 been	 made	 to	 refine,	 classify,	 delineate	 and	confirm	what	is	meant	by	violence	in	sport.	The	vital	importance	of	such	effort	forms	the	conceptual	basis	of	this	paper,	wherein	it	is	hoped	that	revisiting	a	selection	of	some	of	these	ideas	might	leave	sport	scholars	better	equipped	to	avoid	the	often	 implicit	(and	perhaps	unintended)	meanings	that	can	become	attached	to	the	term	‘violence’	as	a	descriptor	of	sporting	practices.	In	what	follows,	we	explore	some	of	the	foundational	and	conceptual	underpinnings	of	sociological	definitions	of	violence	in	 general,	 and	 sports	 violence	 in	 particular.	 At	 first	 glance	 this	 may	 seem	 to	 be	 an	 oddly	retrospective	step	if	 the	reader	is	 familiar	with	the	vast	amount	of	published	work	within	the	area.	However,	as	Kevin	Young	(2012;	1)	has	recently	argued:			 Almost	 none	 of	 the	 colossal	 sociological/criminological	 literature	 [on	 violence]	 even	mentions	the	types	of	violence	that	may	be	done	in	sport	contexts,	and	it	certainly	does	not	take	 the	 next	 step	 to	 examine	 whether	 violence	 in	 different	 social	 institutions	 shares	commonalities	in	cause,	expression	or	outcome.		This	 is	 a	 field,	 then,	 that	 even	with	 Young’s	 (2012)	 recent	 and	 fairly	 comprehensive	 analysis	 still	requires	 further	 sociological	 attention.	 Indeed,	 it	 is	 recent	 additions	 to	 the	 stock	 of	 knowledge	concerning	player	violence	in	sport	that	are	of	particular	interest	here.	Through	an	exploration	of	a	particular	selection	of	research	 from	the	previous	decade,	we	attempt	 to	outline	 the	 importance	of	engaging	with	 foundational	 debates	 over	 the	meaning	 of	 ‘violence’	within	 this	 scholarly	work.	We	begin	by	briefly	exploring	the	philosophical	and	conceptual	grounds	upon	which	these	definitions	are	constructed.				
Defining	‘Violence’:	Force	and	Violation	
	What	actions,	phenomena	and	events	can	be	subsumed	within	the	term	violence?	Or	perhaps	more	to	the	point,	what	is	violence?	Beneath	this	simple	question	lies	a	long	history	of	implicit	assumptions,	anecdotal	viewpoints	and	philosophical	debate	(see	Sorel,	1961).	As	a	point	of	departure,	we	begin	unpacking	the	use	of	this	term	by	exploring	what	appear	to	be	two	central	themes.	The	goal	is	not	to	provide	an	exhaustive	or	mutually	 exclusive	 conception,	but	 rather	 to	 signpost	 in	broad	 terms	 the	
	 3	
building	 blocks	 that	 together	 largely	 underpin	 contemporary	 understandings	 of	 violence.	 These	initial	observations	provide	 the	 foundation	 for	 subsequent	discussions	and	conclusions	within	 this	paper	 and	 may	 be	 of	 use	 more	 broadly	 for	 those	 wishing	 to	 gain	 conceptual	 purchase	 on	 the	meanings	of	violence	in	general	or	sports	violence	in	particular.		Within	 the	 extant	 literature,	 two	 salient	 and	 interconnected	 positions	 consistently	 resurface	 and	provide	 the	 conceptual	 basis	 for	 sometimes	 opposing	 and	 sometimes	 complementary	understandings	 and	 definitions	 of	 violence.	 These	 positions	 can	 be	 categorised	 as	 focusing	 on	 the	perpetrator	or	the	victim.	When	attention	is	upon	the	perpetrator	of	violence,	the	term	highlights	the	intentional,	 destructive	 force	 that	 he	 or	 she	 projects	 towards	 someone	 or	 something	 (Audi,	 1971;	Litke,	1992).	Henceforth	referred	to	as	‘violence-as-force’	(Bufacchi,	2005),	this	is	perhaps	the	most	commonly	 employed	 and	 popular	 understanding	 of	 violence	 (Coady,	 1986).	 Audi’s	 (1971,	 59)	definition	provides	a	useful	starting	point:			 Violence	 is	 the	 physical	 attack	 upon,	 or	 the	 vigorous	physical	 abuse	 of,	 or	 vigorous	physical	struggle	 against,	 a	 person	 or	 animal;	 or	 the	 highly	 vigorous	 psychological	 abuse	 of,	 or	 the	sharp,	 caustic	 psychological	 attack	 upon,	 a	 person	 or	 animal;	 or	 the	 highly	 vigorous,	 or	incendiary,	 or	 malicious	 and	 vigorous,	 destruction	 or	 damaging	 of	 property	 or	 potential	property.		Such	 an	 understanding	 of	 violence	 can	 be	 deployed	 in	 a	 restricted	 (Coady,	 1986)	 and	 descriptive	(Platt,	 1992)	 sense.	 In	 this	 way,	 specific	 actions	 and	 behaviours	 can	 be	 clearly	 marked	 out	 as	constituting	 violence.	 Applying	 the	 term	 in	 this	 manner	 allows	 researchers	 to	 increase	 analytical	clarity	by	focusing	on	the	physical	and	psychological	harm	caused	by	an	actor	or	actors.		A	second	definition	of	violence	focuses	on	the	victim,	and	the	violation	of	that	person.	Referred	to	as	‘violence-as-violation’	 (Bufacchi,	 2005),	 this	 shift	 in	 focus	 enables	 a	 broader	 conception	 and	utilisation	 of	 the	 term	 (Garver,	 1977).	Anything	 that	 transgresses	what	 individuals	 consent	 to	 can	now	be	considered	violent;	clearly,	the	verb	‘to	violate’	can	be	interpreted	in	many,	varied	ways.	As	such,	 there	are	 subtle	 and	 stark	differences	within	applications	of	 this	definition.	 Salmi	 (1993,	17)	offers	 an	 overarching	 position:	 “[violence	 is]	 any	 avoidable	 action	 that	 constitutes	 a	 violation	 of	human	rights,	 in	 its	widest	meaning,	or	which	prevents	the	fulfilment	of	a	basic	human	need”.	This	wide	 (Coady,	1986)	and	expansive	 (Grundy	&	Weinstein,	1974)	conception	of	violence	enables	 the	(im)morality	 traditionally	 associated	 with	 the	 term	 to	 be	 employed	 polemically	 towards	 diverse	phenomena	 (Platt,	 1992).	 Subsuming	 the	majority	 of	 physical	 and	 psychological	 violence,	 but	 not	confined	to	such	manifestly	destructive	acts,	this	definition	“has	effectively	sensitised	large	numbers	of	persons	to	the	morally	dubious	status	of	many	social	structures	and	practices”	(Platt,	1992,	189).	Thus,	such	a	definition	illuminates	violence	in	both	its	obvious,	tangible	and	direct	forms	–	such	as,	for	 example,	 the	 physical	 violence	 of	 a	 gang-related	murder	 –	 but	 also	more	 subtle,	 systemic	 and	insidious	 manifestations	 –	 such	 as	 the	 symbolic	 and	 structural	 violence	 of	 a	 society	 shaped	 by	institutional	racism,	class-based	poverty,	and	other	contributing	factors	which	may	lead	individuals	to	join	criminal	gangs	in	the	first	place.		Attempts	have	been	made	 to	contrast,	delineate	and	prise	apart	 these	 interwoven	and	overlapping	understandings	of	violence.	Keane	(1996,	66)	argues	against	the	use	of	violence-as-violation	when	he	notes	 that,	 “attempts	 (such	as	 Johan	Galtung’s)	 to	stretch	 [violence’s]	meaning	 to	 include	 ‘anything	avoidable	 that	 impedes	 human	 realization’	 effectively	makes	 a	 nonsense	 of	 the	 concept.”	 For	 Platt	(1992),	the	moral	significance	of	the	term,	which	has	resulted	in	its	extended	use	to	denote	violence-
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as-violation,	detracts	from	its	power	to	describe	violence-as-force,	whereas	Bufacchi	(2005)	accepts	the	 existence	 of	 two	 ideologically	 different	 approaches	 to	 violence.	 These	 subtly	 different	conceptions	may	be	 separable	philosophically	 and	 conceptually	but,	within	 lived	experiences,	 they	exist	to	greater	or	lesser	degrees	as	complex	balances	and	blends	(Dunning,	2008	[1983]).			Therefore,	it	should	not	be	our	goal	to	find	any	singular	‘true’	or	‘correct’	usage	of	the	term	–	when	discussing	 sports	 violence	 Goldstein	 (1983,	 2)	makes	 the	 point	 that	 no	 single	 definition	 “is	 either	possible	or	desirable”	–	but	rather	we	should	attempt	to	find	a	conception	that	is	adequately	theorised	
relative	to	the	important	contributions	of	either	position.	That	is	to	say,	when	considering	whether	or	not,	and	how	exactly,	to	describe	something	as	 ‘violent’,	we	ought	to	attend	to	the	ways	in	which	it	constitutes	 both	 force	 and	 violation.	 As	 addressed	 later	 in	 this	 paper,	 such	 an	 approach	 requires	methodological	sensitivity	to	the	social	contexts	of,	and	subjective	experiences	attached	to,	any	given	manifestation	of	‘violence’.	With	this	initial	point	in	mind,	we	now	further	explore	attempts	to	obtain	conceptual	traction	on	‘violence’	though	an	examination	of	typological	accounts	that	seek	to	anchor	this	rather	abstract	debate	within	extant	social	phenomena.				
‘Types’	of	Violence	
	Galtung’s	(1981)	call	for	an	exhaustive	and	mutually	exclusive	typology	may	be	a	step	too	far	for	such	a	 complex	 phenomenon,	 as	 behaviours	 which	 can	 be	 described	 by	 these	 two	 broad,	 partially	overlapping	 and	 partially	 differentiated	 conceptions	 of	 violence	 resist	 easy	 categorisation	 and	definition.	However,	engaging	with	the	process	of	typological	classification	can	provide	the	thematic	and	conceptual	grounding	required	for	a	solid	foundational	knowledge	of	the	concept.	 	 In	this	way,	some	of	the	inadequacies	of	implicit	or	anecdotal	understandings	of	violence	can	in	part	be	revealed.	In	 what	 follows,	 we	 address	 five	 substantively	 different,	 although	 never	 completely	 discrete,	categories	of	violence.	This	is	by	no	means	an	exhaustive	list,	nor	a	proposed	model	for	how	violence	ought	to	be	imagined	by	scholars,	but	rather	an	attempt	to	highlight	various	ways	in	which	violence	tends	to	be	conceptualised	in	academic	literature.			Of	 these	categories,	 interpersonal	violence	 is	perhaps	that	which	 is	most	commonly	associated	with	the	 term	 violence	 (Audi,	 1971;	 Coady,	 1986).	 Physical	 in	 nature,	 direct	 interpersonal	 violence	 is	manifest	 in	bodily	attempts	to	harm,	abuse	or	kill	others;	whereas	 indirect	 forms	aim	to	destroy	or	damage	 another’s	 property.	 Such	 violence	 is	 mostly	 intentional	 and	 may	 be	 both	 instrumental	(calculated/deliberate)	 and/or	 expressive	 (emotional/reactive)	 (Dunning,	 2008	 [1983];	 Imbusch,	2003).	 Intimately	 tied	 to	 direct	 interpersonal	 violence,	 psychological	 violence	 implies	 a	 lack	 of	physical	 harm;	 in	 its	 place,	 this	 causes	 emotional	 and	 psychological	 damage	 and	 distress	 (Audi,	1971).	 Here,	 gestures,	 symbols,	 words	 and	 images	 are	 used	 to	 elicit	 painful	 emotions	 in	 others	(Cauchy,	 1992;	 Dunning,	 2008	 [1983];	 Imbusch,	 2003).	 This	 separation	 of	 the	 physical	 and	psychological	 may	 at	 times	 be	 conceptually	 useful,	 although	 applying	 such	 separation	 to	 all	 lived	experiences	risks	failing	to	represent	the	multifaceted	experience	of	violence;	consider,	for	example,	the	physical	and	psychological	trauma	of	sexual	violence.	Thus,	sensitivity	towards	the	difficulties	of	this	conceptual	separation	is	an	important	element	of	scholarly	applications	of	these	terms.		The	previously	described	violences	can	be	further	contextualised	by	institutional	violence.	This	state-sanctioned	violence	is	typically	carried	out	by	the	military	and	police	forces	(Dunning,	2008	[1983];	Imbusch,	 2003).	 The	 often	 taken-for-granted	 moral	 legitimacy	 that	 can	 accompany	 such	 acts	 is	problematised	when	 the	 term	 ‘violence’	 is	used	 to	describe	 them.	Examples	of	 the	death	 sentence,	
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harmful	means	of	restraint	by	police	officers,	treatment	of	prisoners	of	war	and	police	tactics	during	riots	and	demonstrations	highlight	the	political	sensitivity	that	accompanies	using	the	term	‘violence’	in	 this	 context.	 Within	 ‘civilising’	 societies,	 these	 forms	 of	 legitimised	 violence	 persist,	 to	 some	degree,	where	other	forms	of	physical	and	psychological	violence	have	gradually	come	under	stricter	internal	and	external	control	(Elias,	2000	[1939]).	Institutional	violence	provides	an	important	layer	to	an	analysis	of	violence;	it	sensitises	us	to	the	often-arbitrary	nature	of	dichotomous	assumptions	about	the	moral	legitimacy	of	such	actions.			The	 forms	 of	 violence	 described	 thus	 far	 can	 be	 defined	 using	 both	 the	 violence-as-force	 and	violence-as-violation	conceptions.	However,	 the	 fault	 line	between	these	 two	 foundations	begins	 to	widen	when	symbolic	violence	becomes	part	of	the	analysis.	Here,	the	essence	of	violence-as-force	is	(at	 least	 partly)	 removed	 and	 replaced	 by	 a	 focus	 on	 the	 violation	 of	 a	 victim	 or	 victims.	 Poverty,	marginalisation,	alienation	and	oppression	are	hallmarks	of	such	violence.	Symbolic	violence	carries	with	 it	 “a	 power	 which	 presupposes	 recognition,	 that	 is,	 misrecognition	 of	 the	 violence	 that	 is	exercised	 through	 it”	 (Bourdieu,	 1991,	 209).	 Bourdieu	 (1991)	 uses	 the	 term	 to	 describe	 the	discrimination	that	is	 inherent	within	often	taken-for-grated	social	 institutions	such	as	religion,	the	state,	 language	 and	 the	 gender	 order.	 Such	 violence	 is	 veiled	 and	 concealed	 behind	 unspoken,	perhaps	unconscious,	acceptance	of	the	norms	and	values	attached	to	these	social	institutions	which	reproduce	inequalities	(Bourdieu,	1991).			Symbolic	 violences	 can	 be	 inconspicuous	 due,	 in	 part,	 to	 their	 ubiquity.	 There	 is	 a	 danger	 here	 of	reifying	social	 structures	and	removing	any	 trace	of	 the	dense	 interdependencies	 that	 characterise	the	human	interactions	that	cause	such	 inequalities.	Notwithstanding	the	need	to	be	aware	of	such	reification,	 employing	 the	 term	 symbolic	 violence,	 with	 its	 value-laden	moral	 undertones,	 enables	academics	 to	 highlight	 and	 challenge	 these	 less	 obvious	 forms	 of	 violation.	 By	 contrasting	 other,	directly	forceful	manifestations	of	violence	with	the	often	more	indirect	force	deployed	by	symbolic	violence,	 we	 begin	 to	 notice	 markedly	 different	 applications	 of	 the	 two	 previously	 discussed	philosophical	definitions.	However,	while	this	and	the	preceding,	more	obviously	‘forceful’	examples	of	 violence	 fit	 rather	 neatly	within	wider	 conceptions	 of	 violence-as-violation,	 in	what	 follows,	 an	example	 of	 violence-as-force	which	 cannot	 be	 considered	 violation	 of	 the	 person	 in	 quite	 such	 an	obvious	sense	is	presented.	As	such,	it	proves	to	be	one	of	the	more	contentious	issues	and	debating	points	within	definitions	of	violence	(Audi,	1971).		
Ritualised	violence,	of	which	central	aspects	of	the	action	within	contact	sports	such	as	boxing,	rugby,	ice	 hockey	 and	 wrestling	 are	 examples,	 is	 substantively	 different	 from	 the	 previously	 described	forms	 of	 violence.	 This	 staged,	managed	 violence	 –	 which	 exists	 within	 context-specific	 formal	 or	informal	norms	of	acceptability	–	is	often	expressly	instrumental	or	theatrical	in	nature	and	holds	a	significant	 symbolic	 and	 sub-cultural	 component	 (Maguire,	 1992;	 Matthews,	 2014).	 Such	 violence	involves	 a	move	 away	 from	 the	malicious	 intent	 to	 cause	 physical	 or	 psychological	 harm	 towards	action	 targeted	 at	 achieving	 some	 other,	 generally	 socially	 acceptable	 objective	 (Dunning,	 2008	[1983]).	 Often	 ‘mimetic’	 of	 direct	 interpersonal	 violence	 and	 engaged	 in	 predominantly	 on	 a	voluntary	 basis,	 examples	 of	 ritualised	 violence	 include	 sadomasochism	 (Chancer,	 1992),	professional	wrestling	(de	Garis,	1999),	and	contact	sports	(Elias	&	Dunning,	2008	[1986]).			Such	 ritual	 performances	 are	 fundamentally	 different	 from	 the	 violent	 acts	 of	 which	 they	 are	 a	mimesis.	Importantly,	participants	engaging	in	such	ritualised	violence	are	able	to	engender	similar	emotions	 and	 sensations	 to	 those	 experienced	 during	 ‘real	 life’	 violent	 encounters,	while	 avoiding	some	of	the	typical	physical,	psychological	and	social	dangers	associated	with	them	(Atkinson,	2008;	
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Maguire,	1992;	Matthews,	2014).	The	emotions	produced	during	ritualised	violence,	“are	the	‘sibling’	of	 those	 aroused	 in	 real-life	 situations”	 (Maguire,	 1992,	 105).	 This	 form	 of	 violence	may	 have	 the	appearance	 of	 constituting	 violence-as-force	 –	 particularly	 when	 it	 results	 in	 physical	 trauma	 to	participants,	 as	 is	 often	 the	 case	 –	 but	 it	 does	 not	 fit	 easily	 within	 the	 definition	 of	 violence-as-violation.	In	Audi’s	(1971,	59)	words:			 In	most	usual	cases,	violence	involves	the	violation	of	some	moral	right	…	there	are	cases,	like	wrestling	and	boxing,	in	which	even	paradigmatic	violence	can	occur	without	violation	of	any	moral	right.		Importantly,	and	once	more	returning	 to	our	earlier	comments	about	 the	 interconnected	nature	of	such	 experiences,	 ritualised	 violence	 “can	 involve	 elements	 of,	 or	 be	 transformed	 into,	 non-ritual	violence”	 (Dunning,	 2008	 [1983],	 225).	 Principally,	 such	 ‘slippage’	 would	 include	 acts	 defined	simultaneously	 through	 violence-as-force	and	 -violation,	 such	 as	when	 professional	wrestlers	 take	personal	 vendettas	 into	 a	 performance	 and	 deliberately	 harm	 their	 (unsuspecting)	 opponents	(Smith,	 2008),	 or	 when	 a	 contact	 sport	 athlete	 is	 pressured	 by	 a	 coach	 into	 harming	 their	 body	through	 excessively	 rough	 and	 risky	 play	 (Messner,	 1990;	 Young,	 2012).	 Barring	 such	 obvious	transgressions	 of	 the	 situational	 codes	 of	 legitimacy,	 ritualised	 violence	 is	 clearly	 experienced	 and	understood	differently	than	when	the	same	actions	are	engaged	in	outside	of	their	ritualised	context.	Grasping	 the	 notion	 of	 violence-as-violation,	 and	 attending	 to	 the	 subjective	 experience	 of	being/feeling	violated	(or	not),	is	key	to	understanding	this	complex	behaviour,	and	perhaps	thereby	questioning	the	appropriateness	of	the	term	‘violence’	to	explain	it.		Thus,	 through	 this	 typological	 discussion,	 the	 complex	 nature	 of	 violence	 becomes	 apparent.	Applying	any	 form	of	 strict	definition	or	static	 typology	 to	 frame	such	experiences	may	reduce	 the	potential	to	portray	an	accurate	picture	of	these	multidimensional	experiences.	However,	a	failure	to	be	 cognisant	 of	 the	 multitude	 of	 ways	 in	 which	 violence	 might	 be	 conceptualised	 leaves	 an	unsatisfactory	 looseness	 to	 accounts	 that	 attempt	 to	 explore	 such	 experiences.	 Indeed,	 without	adequate	 attempts	 to	 engage	 with	 definitional	 literature,	 researchers	 often	 employ	 implicit	understandings	 of	 violence,	 which	 can	 be	 read	 and	 interpreted	 in	 a	 variety	 of	 ways	 –	 perhaps	including	those	which	they	were	not	themselves	 intending.	 In	this	regard,	 the	preceding	discussion	does	 not	 offer	 a	 panacea	 to	 cure	 all	 our	 terminological	 and	 conceptual	 ills;	 rather,	 we	 seek	 to	highlight	 the	 importance	 of	 engaging	with	 foundational	 premises	 in	 order	 to	move	 closer	 towards	some	 level	 of	 explicit	 affirmation	 regarding	 the	 concept.	 With	 this	 in	 mind,	 we	 now	 turn	 more	specifically	to	sports-related	violence.				
Revisiting	Foundational	Typologies	of	Sports-Related	Violence	
		For	Young	(2000),	the	concept	of	sports	violence	is	an	elusive	one.	As	shown	above,	being	challenged	to	define	the	concept	of	violence	 in	a	general	sense	throws	simplistic,	 taken-for-granted	or	 implicit	understandings	 into	 doubt.	 And	when	 it	 comes	 to	 sport,	 this	 is	 as	much	 the	 case	 for	 sports	 fans,	members	of	 sports’	 governing	bodies	 and	athletes	 as	 it	 is	 for	 academics	 (Young,	2000).	Within	his	recent	examination	of	sports-related	violence	(SRV),	Young	(2012)	describes	in	depth	the	plethora	of	violences	that	are	connected	to	sports	worlds.	Of	the	eighteen	substantively	different	violences	that	Young	(2012)	identifies,	our	present	paper	focuses	on	phenomena	that	are	perhaps	most	commonly	imagined	 to	 constitute	 SRV;	 that	 is,	 on-field	player	 violence.	 Early	 explorations	of	 this	 type	of	 SRV	attempted	 to	 produce	 a	 level	 of	 analytical	 clarity	 via	 typological	 categorisation	 (Dunning,	 2008	
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[1983];	 Smith,	 1983),	 and	 it	 is	 to	 these	 we	 now	 turn,	 highlighting	 both	 the	 implicit	 and	 explicit	contribution	they	can	make	to	developing	researchers’	understanding	of	SRV.		
Smith’s	Typology	
	Smith’s	 influential	socio-legal	typology	is	 implicitly	based	on	a	violence-as-force	definition,	but	also	incorporates	a	sensitivity	to	violence-as-violation.	Smith	identifies	four	types	of	direct	interpersonal	(physical)	 violence	 based	 on	 a	 scale	 of	 legal	 and	 (sub)cultural	 legitimacy.	 The	 first	 of	 these	 types,	
brutal	 body	 contact,	 is	 described	 as	 “significant	 bodily	 contact	 within	 the	 rules	 of	 a	 given	 sport”	(Smith,	1983,	34).	With	the	qualification	of	being	integral	to	sporting	activities,	such	as	punching	in	boxing,	these	acts	are	in	effect	legal	under	the	laws	of	the	land	despite	often	being	illegal	outside	of	their	sporting	contexts.	Smith’s	hesitation	to	use	the	word	‘violence’	here	is	indicative	of	a	sensitivity	towards	the	consent	that	athletes	give,	either	implicitly	or	explicitly,	to	trade	such	blows	within	the	rules	 of	 the	 games	 they	 play;	 being	 mutually	 agreed	 upon,	 brutal	 body	 contact	 cannot	 directly	constitute	violence-as-violation.1	Meanwhile,	borderline	violence	is	that	which	does	violate	the	official	rules	 of	 a	 sport,	 but	 is	 still	 considered	 enough	of	 a	 routine	 and	normalised	occurrence	 to	be	dealt	with	within	the	confines	of	a	given	match	or	game	–	such	as	a	late	tackle	in	rugby	union.	Again,	the	widespread	acceptance	that	physically	injurious	fouls	will	happen	as	‘part	of	the	game’	stretches	the	notion	of	athletes’	consent,	problematizing	the	straightforward	use	of	the	term	‘violence’	here.			However,	quasi-criminal	violence	 is	that	which	is	considered	unacceptable,	violating	the	rules	of	the	sport	to	such	an	extent	that	it	also	contravenes	the	laws	of	the	land.	This	type	of	violence	takes	place	in	 something	 of	 a	 legal	 ‘grey	 area’,	 wherein	 punishments	 are	 generally	 handed	 out	 by	 sports	authorities	 rather	 than	 the	 judicial	 system,	 suggesting	yet	 further	 tacit	 social	 acceptance	of	 violent	behaviours	 in	 sport.	An	example	here	would	be	mass	brawling	 in	 team	games	–	 a	match	might	be	cancelled	 and	 fines	 or	 bans	 imposed,	 but	 the	 event	 would	 not	 necessarily	 lead	 to	 the	 criminal	prosecution	 of	 those	 involved.	 Criminal	 violence,	 meanwhile,	 extends	 beyond	 any	 framework	 for	acceptance	 within	 sport,	 and	 results	 in	 prosecution	 (Smith,	 1983).	 Following	 from	 this	 criterion,	Young	 (2012)	 suggests	 that	 Smith’s	 typology	 suffers	 somewhat	 today	 for	 being	 slightly	 dated;	pointing	to	the	increasingly	common	nature	of	legal	interventions	into	sport-related	injuries,	Young	argues	that	Smith’s	categories	are	very	often	blurred	in	practice.	Indeed,	the	definitional	parameters	of	Smith’s	terminology	can	at	times	seem	somewhat	arbitrary,	but	we	nevertheless	believe	that	this	model	works	well	 in	 conceptual	 terms,	 helping	 identify	 sports	violences	 in	 a	 plural	 and	 contextual	manner	rather	than	as	a	single	thing	existing	in	the	same	sense	across	all	sports	worlds.	Of	 further	importance	is	Smith’s	careful	handling	of	the	word	‘violence’	itself;	by	refusing	to	use	it	for	the	most	common	and	accepted	group	of	behaviours,	and	qualifying	it	for	those	which	exist	at	the	‘borderline’	of	acceptability,	Smith	implicitly	shows	us	to	be	cautious	over	our	own	use	of	the	term.		
Dunning’s	Typology	
	However,	 through	 its	 focus	 on	 relative	 legitimacy,	 Smith’s	 work	 is	 less	 sensitive	 to	 some	 of	 the	philosophical	and	conceptual	issues	previously	discussed;	within	his	socio-legal	framing,	much	of	the	complex	 and	 overlapping	 nature	 of	 the	 experience	 of	 SRV	 are	 reduced	 and	 stripped	 away.	 In	 this	regard,	 Dunning’s	 (2008	 [1983])	 examination	 of	 violence,	 which	 draws	 on	 Weber’s	 typology	 of	action,	offers	a	broader	 foundation	 from	which	 to	 consider	 the	experiential	dimensions	of	 SRV.	He	constructs	 a	 typology	 by	 defining	 a	 set	 of	 polarities	 and	 balances	 between	 salient	 elements	 of	phenomena	 typically	 described	 as	 violent.	 In	 this	 way,	 such	 phenomena	 are	 not	 categorised	 as	mutually	exclusive	types;	rather,	a	grasp	of	the	 inherent	complexity,	dynamism	and	fluidity	of	such	
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experiences	can	be	gained.	Violence	is	then	conceptualised	by	Dunning	as	a	set	of	balances	between	
ritual/non-ritual,	 legitimate/illegitimate,	 armed/unarmed,	 physical/psychological,	
intentional/accidental,	 instigative/reactive	 and	 instrumental/expressive	 components	 (Dunning,	2008	[1983]).	For	Dunning,	each	act	of	violence	is	a	blend	of	these	intertwined	polarities.			Such	 reasoning	draws	out	much	of	 the	 richness	 and	 complexity	 from	 lived	 experiences	 that	might	have	 otherwise	 been	 casually	 subsumed	 under	 the	 umbrella	 term	 of	 (sports-related)	 violence.	However,	we	argue	that	the	key	contribution	of	this	multi-faceted	model	to	our	appreciation	of	the	social,	physical	and	emotional	significance	of	SRV	are	the	balances	between	its	ritual/non-ritual	and	legitimate/illegitimate	 components.	 This	 is	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 examining	 the	 extent	 to	which	 any	potentially	 ‘violent’	action	might	be	bound	up	in	contextually-specific	sporting	ritual,	or	considered	legitimate	by	members	of	athletic	subcultures,	requires	examination	 from	the	point	of	view	of	 those	
involved.	This	is	particularly	vital	when	we	consider	the	importance	of	violence-as-violation,	because	grasping	whether	or	not	something	constitutes	a	violation	of	a	person	clearly	cannot	be	done	without	interrogating	 the	 person’s	 lived	 experience	 of	 that	 thing.	 As	 such,	 the	 reasoning	 behind	Dunning’s	model	highlights	 the	necessity	of	attending	to	 individuals’	 lived	experiences	of	 ‘violence’	before	we	can	confidently	assign	this	morally	evaluative	label.	In	other	words,	the	dimensions	it	requires	us	to	account	for	underscore	the	need	for	sound	empirical	research	into	the	specific	meanings	and	values	attached	to	sporting	activities	by	their	practitioners.			In	what	follows,	we	explore	a	selection	of	scholarly	articles	that	have	empirically	examined	SRV	as	a	means	of	demonstrating	 the	detail	 and	utility	of	 these	models,	 and	 the	 lessons	 they	both	explicitly	and	implicitly	teach	us.	It	is	hoped	that	this	undertaking	will	provide	practical	examples	of	why	it	is	important	 to	 engage	 with	 attempts	 to	 define	 player	 violence	 specifically,	 and	 SRV	 more	 broadly,	when	investigating	this	highly	complex	phenomenon.			
Player	Violence	in	Contemporary	Sociological	Accounts	of	Sport	
 The	 following	 sections	 therefore	 detail	 several	 examples	 from	 relatively	 recent	 literature	wherein	such	a	sensitivity	to	these	prior	works,	and	the	vital	theoretical	 labour	that	they	have	attempted,	 is	missing.	Importantly,	it	must	be	noted	that	this	is	not	an	exhaustive	review	of	such	research;	there	is	not	the	space	required	within	this	paper	to	cast	such	a	wide	net	while	still	drawing	attention	to,	and	adequately	 exploring,	 the	 key	 conceptual	 points	we	wish	 to	make.	Neither	 do	we	 suggest	 this	 is	 a	representative	sample	of	the	field.	Rather,	we	have	selected	a	sample	that	provides	opportunities	to	demonstrate	the	 importance	of	engaging	with	definitions	of	violence	and	SRV;	delineating	different	‘types’	of	SRV;	and	understanding,	in	particular,	its	ritualistic,	‘mimetic’	dimensions.			
Defining	violence	–	Pappas	et	al	(2004)	and	Gill	(2007)	
	Pappas	et	al	 (2004)	examined	the	relationship	between	 ‘on-ice’	and	 ‘off-ice’	violence	 in	 ice	hockey.	Their	aim	was	to	“explore,	through	in-depth	interviews	with	five	former	college/professional	hockey	players,	 the	 nature	 of	 aggression	 and	 violence	 in	 their	 sport	 and	 its	 relationship	 to	 violent	interpersonal	 behaviours	 both	 inside	 and	 outside	 of	 sport”	 (Pappas	 et	 al,	 2004,	 293).	 Such	 an	interesting	 piece	 of	 research	 demands	 a	 sophisticated	 understanding	 of	 the	 subtleties	 constituting	players’	 representations	 and	 experiences	 of	 varied	 forms	 of	 violence.	 However,	 the	 subsequent	definition	of	violence	used	for	the	paper	fails	to	engage	with	the	complexities	outlined	above	in	any	meaningful	way:	“Violence	 is	defined	as	male-to-male	physical	sport-related	violence,	male-to-male	
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physical	 out-of-sport	 interpersonal	 violence,	 and	 male-to-female	 physical,	 sexual,	 and	 emotional	aggression	 and	 abuse”	 (2004,	 293).	 It	 is	 unclear	what	 differences	 Pappas	 et	 al	 (2004)	 considered	might	 exist	 between	 ‘sport-related’	 and	 ‘out-of-sport’	 violence,	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 many	 other	studies	(e.g.,	Hughes	&	Coakley,	1991;	Messner,	1990;	Maguire,	1992;	Matthews,	2014,	2016;	Young,	2000;	 2012)	 of	 such	 phenomena	 emphasise	 complex,	 multifaceted,	 sometimes	 discrete	 and	sometimes	overlapping	sets	of	experiences	within	and	between	them.	Interestingly,	they	also	appear	to	disregard	the	possibility	of	sexual	violence	occurring	between	men,	or	in	any	direction	other	than	male-to-female.		This	 somewhat	 vague	 foundational	 conceptualisation	 then	 forms	 the	 basis	 of	 their	 exploration	 of	these	men’s	experiences	of	violence.	Throughout	the	paper,	violence	is	discussed	with	only	minimal	attempts	to	delineate	the	specific	characteristics	of	such	acts.	Take	the	following	example:		 Players	understand	the	possibility	of	violence	on	the	ice,	and	know	that	fighting	is	advocated	as	 a	 proactive	 means	 for	 not	 being	 easily	 intimidated	 and	 guarding	 against	 further	aggression	 ...	 In	 general,	 there	 appears	 to	 be	 widespread	 support,	 both	 institutional	 and	community,	 for	violence	associated	with	sport,	both	within	and	outside	 the	sports	context.	(Pappas	et	al,	2004,	303)		Do	all	players	accept	the	possibility	of	violence	equally?	Are	they	referring	to	all	on-ice	fighting	here,	or	are	there	different	forms	that	are	seen	to	be	more	or	less	legitimate?	Is	it	not	the	case	that	some	violences	would	not	be	accepted	by	players,	community	members	and	institutions?	And	if	such	actors	are	largely	accepting	of	(most)	on-ice	fighting,	does	this	not	in	some	way	problematize	labelling	this	particular	behaviour	as	‘violence’	to	begin	with?	Overall,	the	extant	relationship	between	legitimate,	widely	 accepted	 forms	 of	 what	 Smith	 (1983)	 might	 deem	 ‘brutal	 body	 contact’	 (or	 perhaps	‘borderline	 violence’)	 and	 illegitimate	 forms	 of	 direct	 interpersonal	 violence	 (culminating	 in	 a	discussion	of	rape)	is	the	focus	of	Pappas	et	al’s	paper.	Yet	through	reading	the	five	questions	upon	which	 their	 interviews	 were	 based,	 which	 broadly	 presuppose	 that	 there	 is	 a	 link	 between	 these	violences	 (2004,	 297),	 the	methodological	 approach	 taken	 did	 not	 provide	 clear	 opportunities	 for	participants	 to	 differentiate	 between	 the	 moral	 or	 experiential	 dimensions	 of	 these	 types	 of	(apparent)	violence;	neither,	for	that	matter,	does	the	paper’s	analysis	include	any	terminological	or	conceptual	 material	 through	 which	 readers	 might	 distinguish	 between	 them	 in	 these	 important	ways.			Pappas	 et	 al’s	 lack	 of	 clear	 definitions	 also	 impinged	 on	 their	 ability	 to	 draw	 out	 the	 richness	 of	conclusions	 linked	 to	masculinity	–	a	 common	 theme	 in	SRV	research.	They	argue	 that	 “embedded	within	 many	 of	 these	 players’	 narratives	 is	 the	 implicit	 recognition	 that	 the	 tendency	 to	 draw	parallels	between	manliness	and	violence	extends	beyond	the	competitive	arena	into	broader	social	relations”	(Pappas	et	al,	2004,	303).	Are	we	to	believe	that	these	men	associated	all	forms	of	violence	with	manliness?	Or	might	 there	have	been	 certain	 forms	of	 (more-or-less	 legitimate)	violence	 that	can	 be	 more	 easily	 associated	 with	 masculine	 ideals,	 while	 other	 forms	 must	 be	 controlled	 or	avoided?	Ultimately,	although	the	authors	stopped	short	of	outright	claiming	a	causal	 link	between	the	 cultural	 celebration	 of	 ‘on-ice	 violence’	 and	 the	 high	 incidence	 of	 sexual	 assault	 among	 male	athletes	more	widely,	 such	a	 relationship	 is	 clearly	 implied	 in	 this	paper.	 It	 is	as	 though	 the	 rough	physicality	of	what	 “was	viewed	as	a	violent	 sport”	 (2004,	307)	 is	a	 straightforward	antecedent	of	sexual	 abuse,	 tied	 together	 around	 the	 construction	 of	 masculinity	 within	 ice	 hockey	 culture.	Substantiated	by	data	gathered	from	a	very	small	sample,	using	what	we	interpret	as	rather	closed	
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and	leading	questions,	we	are	left	feeling	that	these	authors	have	painted	a	rather	simplistic	picture	of	ice	hockey	players’	perspectives	on	SRV.			The	 second	 paper	 we	 examine	 with	 respect	 to	 definitional	 clarity	 is	 Gill’s	 (2007)	 exploration	 of	‘violent’	 femininity.	Here,	 experiences	of	physicality	 and	 ritualised	violence	within	 rugby	are	 again	viewed	relative	to	 interpersonal	violence	away	from	such	sports	worlds,	and	interpreted	through	a	gender-sensitive	 analysis.	 Yet	 without	 the	 conceptual	 language	 needed	 to	 account	 for	 subtle	differences	between	the	ways	 in	which	 these	women	signify	 their	experiences,	Gill	 runs	 the	risk	of	overlaying	 her	 own	 interpretations	 of	 what	 constitutes	 ‘violence’	 onto	 their	 accounts.	 Take	 the	following	example:		 The	 improved	 body	 image	 is	 due	 to	 the	women’s	 participation	 in	 a	 violent	 and	 embodied	context:				
The	actual	 game	 itself	 I	 enjoy...	 It’s	 the	 physical...	 I	 like,	 not	 that	 you’d	 actually	 hurt	
somebody	but	you	know	what	I	mean?	(Ciara).	(Gill,	2007,	421)	
	Using	Smith’s	typology,	 ‘Ciara’s’	experiences	of	 ‘the	physical’,	non-hurtful	aspects	of	rugby	might	be	most	suitably	defined	as	‘brutal	body	contact’	(i.e.,	not	clearly	‘violence’	as	such);	while	in	Dunning’s	model,	 clearly	 ‘Ciara’	 approaches	 rugby’s	 physicality	 without	 the	 intent	 to	 harm,	 and	 one	 must	reasonably	 expect	 that	 the	 behaviours	 she	 describes	 are	 considered	wholly	 legitimate	 within	 this	sport.	With	 this	 in	mind,	 and	 lacking	 further	 clarification,	 it	 is	 challenging	 to	 find	 the	 ‘violence’	 of	rugby	 in	 this	 particular	 quotation,	 or	 in	 the	 others	 like	 it	 that	 Gill	 provides,	 particularly	 when	employing	a	violence-as-violation	definition.		Indeed,	nowhere	within	Gill’s	(2007)	account	do	we	find	out	if	her	participants	actually	think	of	their	engagement	 in	 rugby	 as	 ‘violent’.	 This	 assumption	of	 violence	 is	 particularly	 interesting	when	one	considers	some	of	the	claims	that	Gill	(2007)	makes	within	her	paper.	In	particular,	she	argues	that,	“in	identifying	themselves	as	violent	protagonists	and	victims	of	violence	they	are	able	to	articulate	an	 independent	 and	 powerful	 position	 as	 women,	 and	 redefine	 what	 femininity	 means	 in	 such	contexts”	 (2007,	 425).	 Although	 this	 conclusion	 certainly	 resonates	 in	 part	 with	 our	 own	perspectives	on	the	experiences	of	women	who	engage	in	heavy	contact	sports	(see	AUTHORS),	it	is	problematic	 that	 the	data	 is	presented	without	an	exploration	of	how	these	women	actually	define	the	‘violence’	of	their	rugby	behaviours.			Such	 clarity	 is	 vitally	 important	 considering	 the	 morally	 evaluative	 nature	 of	 the	 term	 ‘violence’,	particularly	 for	 discussions	 surrounding	 sex,	 gender,	 and	 feminist	 praxis.	 No	 doubt	 these	 women	could	engage	in	some	actions	which	might	be	rightly	defined	as	violent	in	some	respect,	but	what	is	really	needed	is	an	attempt	to	find	out	how,	and	in	what	ways,	these	women	themselves	speak	about	and	interpret	the	ritualised	and	interpersonal	violences	taking	place	within	rugby.	Without	such	an	exploration,	Gill’s	politically-minded	conclusions	appear	to	rest	on	her	own	account	of	rugby	and	its	community,	 rather	 than	 the	women	whose	 lives	 she	 is	 attempting	 to	 represent.	We	 dare	 say	 that	many	within	the	sport	of	rugby	–	and	perhaps	Gill’s	respondents	themselves	–	would	take	issue	with	such	an	unproblematic	labelling	of	their	sport	as	‘violent’.		
Typologies	of	violence	–	Guilbert	(2004)	
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These	 initial	 comments	 have	 highlighted	 the	 need	 to	 engage	 with	 some	 attempt	 at	 grasping	 or	constructing	 reliable	 and	 workable	 definitions	 of	 what	 does	 or	 does	 not	 constitute	 ‘violence’	 in	various	sports,	with	particular	respect	to	the	experiences	of	those	people	involved	in	them.	Guilbert	(2004)	attempts	to	gain	such	conceptual	clarity	within	a	relatively	recent	typology2	of	SRV.	He	begins	with	 a	 bold	 but	 highly	 problematic	 opening	 statement:	 “News	 headlines	 featuring	 regular	‘aggression’	 against	 footballer	David	Beckham,	 the	prosecution	brought	 against	 the	Festina	 cycling	team,	or	the	Le	Gougne	affair	in	skating,	among	other	stories	hitting	the	front	page,	are	clear	evidence	of	the	omnipresence	of	violence	in	sport”	(2004,	45).	Are	we	to	believe,	from	these	three	anecdotal	examples,	 that	 violence	 is	 ‘omnipresent’	 in	 all	 sports?	 For	 a	 paper	 attempting	 to	 provide	 a	foundational	exploration	of	SRV,	this	is	a	very	dubious	beginning.			On	 the	 following	 page	 of	 the	 paper,	 Guilbert	 spells	 out	 a	 rough	 list	 of	 those	 types	 of	 violence	 he	believes	to	be	most	common	in	sports:		 In	the	field	of	‘competitive	sporting	events’	(Bourdieu,	1980)	violence	in	many	forms	may	be	observed.	 Physical	 violence	 (brawls,	 assaults,	 blows,	 falls),	 verbal	 violence	 (abuse,	 threats,	protests),	psychological	violence	(war	of	nerves,	harassment,	moral	breakdown	–	‘blowing	a	fuse’	 as	 the	 phrase	 goes)	 and	 cheating	 (game	 fixing,	 corruption,	 match-rigging,	 taking	 of	performance-enhancing	drugs)	are	the	most	frequent	forms	of	violence.	(2004,	46)		It	seems,	from	the	examples	presented,	that	violence	is	used	here	as	a	 ‘catch-all’	term	to	define	any	morally	 iniquitous	 activity	 associated	with	 sport.	 Thinking	 back	 to	 our	 previous	 discussion	 of	 the	wide	and	expansive	definition	potentially	offered	by	conceiving	of	violence-as-violation,	we	might	be	able	to	find	some	academic	merit	to	this.	However,	if	one	is	to	claim	behaviours	as	diverse	as	assaults,	falls,	threats,	game	fixing,	and	doping	all	count	as	violence,	some	level	of	clarification	and	discussion	around	 the	 conceptual,	 experiential,	 cultural	 and	 other	 differences	 existing	 between	 them	 would	seem	to	be	appropriate,	but	is	nevertheless	absent.	We	cannot	help	but	feel	that	this	neatly	evidences	Keane’s	 (1996)	 objection	 to	 the	 un-checked	 employment	 of	 expansive	 definitions	 of	 violence-as-violation.		Notwithstanding	this	 lack	of	clarity,	a	 further,	crucial	dimension	missing	 from	Guilbert’s	attempted	definition	 is	 an	 explicit	 reference	 to	 acts	 of	 apparent	 violence	 that	 occur	 within	 the	 formal	 and	informal	 codes	 of	 any	 given	 sport.	 Later	 in	 the	 paper,	 Guilbert	 draws	 attention	 to	 some	 of	 these	aspects	of	sports	participation	in	a	purely	anecdotal,	overly	reductive	manner:		 We	know	that	some	sporting	activities	require	physical	contact.	Such	is	the	case	of	combat	sports	like	Judo	and	Karate.	The	very	purpose	of	these	sports	is	to	inflict	violence	and	bodily	harm	on	the	opponent...	Others	imply	physical	contact.	This	is	the	case	of	team	games	such	as	soccer	 and	 basketball.	 If	 the	 aim	 is	 not	 to	 cause	 physical	 damage	 but	 achieve	 an	 object,	winning	often	requires	such	damage.	(Guilbert,	2004,	49-50)		This	 dichotomous	 understanding	 of	 such	 sports	 does	 an	 injustice	 to	 the	 complex	 way	 in	 which	participants	 might	 negotiate	 aspects	 of	 ritual	 and	 interpersonal	 violence.	 Indeed,	 to	 suggest	 that	physical	 contact	 is	 only	 ‘implied’	 within	 soccer	 and	 basketball	 downplays	 the	 significance	 that	localised	 and	 contextual	 understandings	 of	 violence	 might	 have	 within	 these	 social	 spaces.	 But	moreover,	the	notion	that	sportized	martial	arts	such	as	Judo	and	Karate	are	embedded	with	violent	purpose	 is	deeply	problematic.	Without	an	adequately	theorised	or	 justified	definition	of	 this	 term,	its	typical	moral	undertones	sneak	into	Guilbert’s	reasoning	and	cast	an	ugly	shadow	over	the	sports	
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he	 so	 casually	 labels	 as	 being	 fundamentally	 violent.	 Given	 the	 political	 implications	 of	 such	 a	description,	we	could	well	suggest	that	this	uncritical	application	of	the	word	risks	becoming	a	form	of	symbolic	violence	itself!3		Such	 conceptual	 errors	 lead	 us	 to	 conclude	 that	 the	 foundational	 understanding	 underpinning	Guilbert’s	(2004)	work	is	lacking	in	crucial	dimensions.	This	is	compounded	by	the	manner	in	which	he	explored	the	area:		 Along	with	sociologists	who	study	blatant	 forms	of	violence	rather	 than	violence	as	such,	 I	tried	 to	 approach	 violence	 in	 sporting	 areas	 indirectly,	 through	 its	 forms.	 I	 asked	competitors	 the	 following	 question:	 ‘How	 do	 you	 represent	 the	main	 forms	 of	 violence	 in	your	sport?’	(Guilbert,	2004,	47)		Ignoring	the	lack	of	clarity	regarding	the	framing	of	(‘blatant’?)	violence	here,	the	question	he	poses	seems	problematic	from	the	outset;	there	is	a	clear	assumption	that	violence	was	an	aspect	of	these	men’s	(no	women	were	 interviewed)	experiences	 in	and,	 importantly,	 interpretation	of,	 their	sport	participation.	 Based	 on	 the	 data	 generated	 by	 asking	 this	 presumptuous	 and	 leading	 question,	Guilbert	(2004)	then	offers	us	three	‘classes’	as	a	means	of	categorising	his	findings:	‘Hard	Violence	Sports’,	‘Soft	Violence	Sports’	and	‘Sports	Where	Violence	does	Not	Exist	or	is	Hidden’.	In	attempting	to	produce	a	broad	typology	based	on	different	sports	rather	than	different	actions,	behaviours	and	interpretations	 possible	within	 said	 sports,	 Guilbert	 (2004)	 appears	 to	 be	 suggesting	 a	 restrictive,	singular	and	wholly	static	image	of	each	sport.	It	is	difficult	to	see	the	ways	in	which	this	typology	is	an	advancement	of	–	for	example	–	Smith’s	(1983)	and/or	Dunning’s	(2008	[1983])	works.			Indeed,	we	 suggest	 that	 Guilbert’s	 (2004)	 analysis	 represents	 a	 retrospective	 step	 that	moves	 our	understanding	 of	 sports	 violence	 more	 in	 line	 with	 unscientific,	 stereotypical	 assumptions	 about	heavy	 contact	 sports	 than	 towards	 a	 genuine	 understanding	 of	 how	SRV	 is	 experienced	 and	 given	meaning	in	diverse	ways	by	its	practitioners.	 In	this	respect,	perhaps	the	most	pressing	conceptual	problem	 within	 Guilbert’s	 (2004)	 paper	 is	 the	 apparent	 lack	 of	 conceptual	 space	 for	 the	 ‘ritual’	dimension	of	sports	violence	(Dunning,	2008	[1983]).	Turning	specifically	 to	 this	phenomenon,	we	now	examine	a	piece	of	research	that	explicitly	critiques	this	‘mimetic’	dimension	of	SRV.		
Ritual	violence	and	mimesis	–	Pringle	(2009)	
	Pringle’s	(2009)	exploration	of	rugby	pleasures	contains	both	substantive	and	conceptual	problems.	Perhaps	 due	 to	 space	 constraints	 imposed	 by	 his	 focus	 on	 pleasure,	 he	 neglects	 to	 engage	 with	attempts	to	define	the	player	violences	that	are	a	central	aspect	of	his	research.	Specifically,	his	lack	of	thorough	engagement	with	previous	typological	attempts	to	define	SRV	means	his	interpretation	of	 rugby	 is	 skewed	 by	 his	 own	 assumptions.	What	 is	 particularly	 frustrating	 in	 this	 respect	 is	 the	manner	 in	 which	 he	 dismisses	 the	 ritual/mimetic	 element	 of	 such	 phenomena,	 simply	 by	 listing	damage	done	to	the	bodies	of	his	interviewees	while	participating	in	rugby,	concluding	that,	“rugby	pleasure,	accordingly,	does	not	appear	well	tempered	or	mimetic”	(2009,	224).	To	discard	this	vital,	experiential	component	of	SRV	simply	due	to	the	presence	of	injuries	represents	a	misreading	of	the	mimetic	dimension	to	which	Dunning	(2008	[1983])	and	Elias	and	Dunning	(2008	[1986])	draw	our	attention,	but	it	also	signals	a	disregard	for	conceiving	of	violence-as-violation,	illustrated	through	a	simultaneous	refusal	to	accept	rugby	players’	own	accounts	of	their	experience	of	ritualised	SRV.		
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With	respect	 to	 the	concept	of	mimesis,	participation	 in	sports	can	be	understood	as	generative	of	similar	emotional	experiences	to	what	we	might	loosely	call	the	‘real-life’	situations	of	which	they	are	a	 selective	 imitation	 (Elias	 and	 Dunning	 2008	 [1986];	 Matthews,	 2014).	 They	 have	 consequences	which	are	usually	less	severe	in	an	objective	sense	than	those	of	their	real-life	equivalents,	but,	of	far	greater	 conceptual	 importance,	 consequences	which	 are	 experienced	 differently	 by	 those	 involved.		Mimetic	 experiences	 draw	 their	 value	 from	 both	 the	 potential	 similarity	 of	 emotional	 feeling	 they	share	with	dangerous,	‘violent’,	or	otherwise	socially	illegitimate	actions,	and	the	differences	in	their	meaning,	purpose	and	typical	consequences	through	which	they	are	positioned	as	socially	acceptable	things	 which	 people	 can	 legitimately	 enjoy.	 This	 distinction	 has	 clear	 implications	 for	 the	 way	 in	which	 acts	 might	 be	 labelled	 as	 violent,	 particularly	 when	 considering	 the	 notion	 of	 violence-as-violation,	 which	 itself	 requires	 a	 contextual	 sensitivity	 well-suited	 to	 exploring	 this	 balance	 of	sameness	and	difference	surrounding	‘real’	and	mimetic	experiences.		A	 fitting	 example	 here	 would	 be	 choking	 someone	 unconscious	 in	 a	 mixed	 martial	 arts	 match.	Thrilling	feelings	through	the	immanence	of	danger,	the	ferocity	of	competition,	or	the	sense	of	one’s	own	physical	power	might	accompany	such	an	act,	but	the	knowledge	that	one	is	doing	so	in	order	to	fairly	 win	 a	 mutually	 agreed-upon,	 rule-bound	 contest,	 rather	 than	 forcefully	 assault	 or	 take	another’s	life	in	a	genuine	fight	for	survival,	confer	moral	legitimacy,	along	with	a	sense	of	ultimate	safety,	 and	 even	mutual	 respect	 upon	 this	 experience.	 This	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 the	 person	 being	choked	 will	 not	 suffer	 pain,	 or	 cannot	 possibly	 be	 injured	 in	 some	 respect;	 indeed,	 injuries	 are	common	in	this	sport,	although	the	ritual	parameters	surrounding	it	(‘tapping	out’,	 the	authority	of	the	referee,	etc.)	clearly	militate	against	the	worst	possible	damage	that	might	be	done	to	athletes	in	these	situations.		Rather	 than	 a	 totally	 pain/injury-free	 experience	 then,	 this	mimetic	 form	 of	 violence	 represents	 a	relatively	 controlled	 risk,	 enabling	 the	 generation	 of	 socially	 significant	 sensations	 and	 emotions,	which	 selectively	 imitate	 those	 felt	within	 ‘real	 life’	 fights	but	 remain	understood	and	experienced	differently	 by	 all	 involved.	 Yet	 in	 his	 analysis	 of	 rugby,	 Pringle	 (2009)	misses	 the	 subtlety	 of	 this	concept	by	means	of	an	 inability	 to	conceptually	differentiate	between	actions	 that	result	 in	bodily	damage.	 Through	 a	 crude	 and	 poorly	 considered	 violence-as-force	 definition,	 the	 fact	 of	 rugby	injuries	is	enough	for	Pringle	to	wave	off	the	notion	that	rugby	involves	a	mimetic	dimension;	that	it	is	a	socially	 legitimate,	experientially	different	variation	of	other,	similar	actions	(e.g.,	battles;	mass	brawls)	 which	 occur	 within	 altogether	 different	 structures	 of	 meaning	 (and	 also,	 for	 that	 matter,	carry	the	potential	to	be	far	more	injurious	because	of	it).		Understanding	 this	 balance	 of	 similarities	 and	 differences,	 and	 how	 they	 are	 given	 meaning	 in	practice,	 is	only	possible	through	interrogating	the	lived	experiences	of	those	involved	in	them.	Yet	while	Pringle’s	(2009)	paper	is	based	on	such	empirical	research,	he	fails	to	spell	out	the	manner	in	which	his	participants’	rugby	injuries	actually	occurred.	Without	this	information	it	is	impossible	for	us	to	begin	to	appreciate	the	complexity	of	the	framing	of	the	actions	that	produce	such	injuries.	Is	it	not	possible	 that	 the	most	 typical	 incidences	of	bodily	damage	 in	 rugby	occur	via	physical	 contact	that	not	only	conforms	to	the	rules	of	the	game	(in	Dunning’s	(2008	[1983])	typology,	is	legitimate),	but	 are	 conducted	without	 the	 intent	 to	 cause	 serious	 injury	 (accidental),	might	 be	 followed	 by	 a	handshake	and	jokingly	re-lived	over	‘a	beer	at	the	pub’	(ritual),	and	are	generally	constructed	by	all	involved	as	‘just	a	part	of	the	game’	and	‘not	real	violence	anyway’	(i.e.,	consensual	and	mimetic)?			
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Indeed,	 despite	 Pringle’s	 (2009)	 overt	 dismissal	 of	 the	 ritual	 aspect	 of	 rugby	 violence,	 he	continuously	quotes	his	interviewees	and	his	own	appreciation	of	the	substantive	difference	between	ritually	legitimated	and	other	types	of	violence.	Take	the	following	example:		 Participants	consent	to	being	tackled	or	rucked	and	possibly	even	being	punched,	but	the	line	is	 drawn	with	 pain	 inflicting	 techniques	 such	 as	 eye	 gouging	 or	 ear	 biting.	 In	 this	manner,	rugby	 involves	 a	 perverse	 mix	 of	 institutionalised	 and	 unwritten	 rules	 concerned	 with	 the	legitimacy	of	techniques	of	violence.	(Pringle,	2009,	227)		Notions	of	 consent	 and	 legitimacy	are	 important	 components	 in	understanding	 sporting	and	other	forms	 of	 mimetic	 violence,	 such	 as	 S&M	 practices,4	 and	 are	 a	 key	 element	 of	 attempts	 to	 define	violence-as-violation	as	outlined	earlier.	Although	Pringle	(2009)	adopts	a	disappointingly	dismissive	and	morally	 judgemental	 tone	 here	 (‘perverse’),	 what	 he	 is	 inadvertently	 highlighting	 is	 the	 often	consenting,	pleasurable	and	legitimate	nature	of	such	experiences	for	participants,	which	separates	ritualised	SRV	(tackling,	rucking)	from	illegitimate,	‘real’	violence	(eye	gouging,	ear	biting).		Pringle	(1992,	223,	emphasis	added)	again	makes	a	distinction	between	 legitimate	and	 illegitimate	types	 of	 violence	when	 he	 tells	 us	 that:	 “some	 of	 the	 interviewees,	 however,	 disapproved	 of	 overt	
violence	 in	 rugby.”	 It	appears	 that	Pringle	 (2009)	uses	 this	 term	to	describe	 interpersonal	violence	which	 clearly	 contravenes	 the	 rules	 and	 norms	 of	 the	 game	 (Smith’s	 (1983)	 ‘quasi-criminal’/‘criminal’	violence,	perhaps).	He	later	quotes	 ‘Morris’	(Pringle,	2009,	227),	who	described	the	 transgression	 of	 what	 he	 and	 other	 rugby	 players	 perceive	 as	 being	 a	 legitimate/illegitimate	boundary:	“I	think	there	was	a	kind	of	acceptance,	a	kind	of	an	unwritten	rule	that	kicking	somebody	in	 the	 head	 was	 kind	 of	 marked	 or	 moved	 from	 acceptable	 violence	 to	 non-acceptable	 violence.”	However,	 it	 seems	 that	Pringle’s	 (2009)	 lack	of	engagement	with	attempts	 to	provide	an	academic	definition	 of	 player	 violence,	 and	 his	 particular	 rejection	 of	 the	 notion	 of	 mimesis,	 left	 him	maintaining	 a	 primacy	 for	 his	 own	 understanding	 of	 violence-as-force,	 at	 times	 ignoring	 the	importance	of	the	meanings	and	definitions	that	the	rugby	players	apply	to	their	own	actions	on	the	field.	Take	the	following	example:		 The	 interviewees	 suggested	 the	 idea	 that	 they	 participated	 in	 rugby	 to	 liberate	 innate	tendencies	for	aggression	or	violence	was	farcical.	 In	fact,	all	of	the	 interviewees	denied	that	they	were	violent	even	when	discussing	their	participation	in	actions	of	unequivocal	violence.	(Pringle,	2009,	226	-	emphasis	added)		Are	we	 to	 believe	 that	 this	 denial	 is	 nothing	 but	 a	 symptom	 of	 the	ways	 in	which	 these	men	 are	cultural	dupes?	Surely	his	participants’	definitions	of	their	actions,	and	the	framing	effect	they	have	on	rugby	pleasures,	 are	an	 important	aspect	of	understanding	 these	experiences?	 Is	 it	 also	not	 the	case	that	such	acts,	rather	than	being	understood	as	‘unequivocal	violence’,	are	inherently	equivocal	with	manifold	variations	in	meaning	and	subjective	definitions?			It	 is	 this	 simplistic	 reduction	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 violence	 that	 leads	 Pringle	 (2009)	 to	 miss	 the	emotional	significance	and	pleasure	that	is	tied	to	the	mimetic	dimension	of	SRV.	Instead	of	actually	clarifying	 why	 it	 is	 that	 rugby	 players	 may	 at	 the	 same	 time	 respect	 each	 other	 and	 apparently	commit	 forms	 of	 violence	 (-as-force)	 against	 each	 other,	 Pringle’s	 (2009)	 analysis	 simply	 points	implicitly	to	an	issue	that	has	been	a	central	theme	within	the	sociological	analysis	of	player	violence.	That	 is,	once	again,	 that	such	action	is	very	often	experienced	as	substantively	different	to	how	the	same	actions	would	be	 in	other	social	contexts.	 In	short,	many	forms	of	SRV	(and	sport	behaviours	
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more	generally)	contain	a	mimetic	dimension,	 through	which	certain	actions	–	despite	 their	risk	of	resulting	in	physical	or	other	forms	of	harm	–	are	ritually	constructed	and	subjectively	experienced	by	athletes	as	not	being	‘violent’	at	all.			
Concluding	Remarks	
	The	aim	of	this	paper	has	been	threefold.	Firstly,	we	have	attempted	to	draw	attention	to	some	key	concerns	 within	 foundational	 attempts	 to	 define	 violence.	 Secondly,	 the	 place	 in	 which	 sports	violence	operates	within	this	conceptual	landscape	has	been	explored.	Thirdly,	we	have	attempted	to	highlight	 the	 importance	 of	 these	 earlier	 comments	 via	 a	 critical	 review	 of	 four	 papers	 that	 have	studied	 player	 violence	 as	 a	 central	 theme.	 Of	 particular	 focus	 has	 been	 the	 tendency	 for	 some	researchers	 to	 ignore	 the	 importance	 of	 defining	 the	 term	 violence,	 but	 in	 particular	 to	 overlook	previous	 scholars’	 theorisations	 of	 player	 violence.	While	 there	 are	 certainly	 problems	within	 the	foundational	typological	models	we	have	discussed,	some	of	which	have	been	highlighted	here,	such	works	still	represent	useful	attempts	to	further	our	understanding	of	sport	worlds	where	apparently	violent	behaviours	may	play	a	significant	role	in	lived	experiences.			The	final	point	we	wish	to	make,	 in	an	attempt	to	move	debates	around	sports	violence	forward,	 is	that	 researchers	 of	 SRV	need	 to	 be	more	 cognisant	 of	 the	 need	 to	 adequately	 frame	definitions	 of	violence	in	their	work,	particularly	with	respect	to	prioritising	the	manner	in	which	people	actually	engaged	in	sports	understand	and	make	sense	of	their	apparent	‘violence’.	It	is	for	this	reason	that,	at	several	points	within	this	paper,	we	have	leant	towards	favouring	a	definition	of	violence	which	rests	most	 heavily	 on	 violence-as-violation.	 We	 argue	 that	 only	 by	 faithfully	 attending	 to	 the	interpretations	 of	 those	 invested	 within	 apparently	 violent	 sports	 can	 researchers	 hope	 to	understand	the	subjective	experiences	that	might	–	or	might	not	–	constitute	violations	of	the	person,	and	failing	to	do	so	often	weakens	analyses	substantially.			Without	 such	 close-up	 interrogation,	 the	 temptation	 to	 use	 the	 term	 ‘violence’	 on	 the	 basis	 of	observed	 harm	 alone	 risks	 misrepresenting	 and	 casting	 unfair	 stigma	 upon	 certain	 sports	 and	athletes.	 We	 dare	 say	 that	 in	 some	 cases,	 this	 arises	 from	 an	 uncritical	 reproduction	 of	 scholars’	aesthetic	distaste	 for	certain	sports	rather	than	a	genuine,	well-theorised	critique.	And	if,	 following	Bourdieu	 (1984),	 we	 acknowledge	 that	 our	 tastes	 are	 largely	 a	 product	 of	 our	 positioning	within	social	 hierarchies,	 then	 overlaying	 aesthetic	 distaste	 with	 moral	 judgement	 within	 academic	discourse	risks	reifying	the	specific	tastes	of	more-or-less	privileged	scholars	as	the	only	legitimate	lens	 through	 which	 to	 view	 apparently	 violent	 sport,	 returning	 to	 the	 issue	 of	 symbolic	 violence	touched	 on	 briefly	 above.	 Ultimately,	 we	 argue	 that	 researchers	 intent	 on	 investigating	 SRV	must	carefully	consider	the	conceptual	platforms	upon	which	they	define,	and	use,	what	remains	a	deeply	morally-loaded	term	if	SRV	scholarship	is	to	do	justice	to	the	people	and	the	phenomena	it	seeks	to	understand.		What	then	does	our	argument	mean	for	the	future	study	of	research	exploring	SRV?	Firstly,	we	argue	that	an	essential	step	 for	scholars	working	 in	 this	area	 is	 to	revisit	 foundational	works	which	have	explored	how	we	can	attempt	to	gain	conceptual	purchase	on	sports	violence.	The	research	papers	we	reviewed	in	the	latter	sections	of	this	paper	paid	little	regard	to	such	works	and	were	deficient	in	a	variety	of	ways	as	a	result.	Rather	than	being	followed	dogmatically	we	suggest	such	early	works	represent	a	fantastic	opportunity	for	contemporary	scholars	to	engage	in	a	dialogue	around	how	we	might	 understand,	 deconstruct	 and	 reconsider	 ‘violence’.	 Secondly,	 there	 appears	 to	 be	 an	
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opportunity	to	think	again	about	violence	by	adopting	a	research	methodology	that	pays	far	greater	heed	to	the	lives,	experiences	and	definitions	favoured	by	participants	and	practitioners	who	engage	with	 apparent	 ‘violence’	 on	 a	 regular	 basis.	 Indeed,	we	 argue	 that	 in	working	with	 such	people	 to	explore	 and	 expand	 definitions	 of	 SRV,	 scholars	 would	 be	 far	 better	 placed	 to	 appreciate	 the	subtleties	 and	 nuances	 of	 experiences	 of	 being	 the	 target	 and/or	 perpetrator	 of	 physically	 (or	otherwise)	 injurious	 action	within	 apparently	 ‘violent’	 sporting	 contexts.	 It	 is	here	 that	we	believe	the	sociological	study	of	sports	violence	can	be	developed,	and	offer	greater	opportunity	to	shed	light	on	social	life	more	broadly.					
Notes	
	1		There	remains	the	possibility	of	conceptualising	the	normalised	legitimacy	of	this	(often)	physically	harmful	 behaviour	 as	 violence-as-violation	 if	 we	 consider	 the	 ways	 that	 many	 young	 men	 (in	particular)	 are	 socialised	 into	 uncritically	 accepting	 the	 risks	 associated	 with	 it	 as	 they	 enter	sporting	 subcultures	 (see	Matthews,	 2014;	Messner,	 1990).	 This	 theorising	 requires	 attention	 to	the	 gendered,	 often	 racialized	 and	 commercially	 exploitive	 symbolic	 violences	 embedded	within	sport,	 and	 requires	 the	 presupposition	 that	 athletes	 are	 duped	 by	 the	 logic	 of	 sport	 and	 its	proponents,	 rather	 than	active	 agents	who	 choose	 to	 take	 risks	 in	order	 to	play	 games	 involving	‘brutal	body	contact’.	2		Previous	typologies	of	sports	violence	were	proposed	in	the	1980s.	3		With	respect	to	other	martial	arts/combat	sports,	the	sport	of	mixed	martial	arts	in	particular	has	long	‘fought	for	acceptance’,	as	the	title	of	Mayeda	and	Ching’s	(2008)	text	puts	it,	against	this	form	of	 discursive	 stigmatisation.	Being	dismissed	 as	 violent	 and	barbaric	 has	 had	 a	 tangibly	negative	impact	on	 the	 sport’s	development,	 but	does	not	 fit	well	with	how	many	practitioners	 and	other	aficionados	 conceive	 of	 and	 experience	 the	 sport	 and	 its	 moral	 landscape	 (e.g.,	 Abramson	 and	Modzelewski,	2011).	That	such	treatment	might	adversely	affect	athletes’	acceptance	within	wider	communities,	 or	 limit	 the	 opportunities	 open	 to	 them	 to	make	 a	 living	 through	 the	 sport,	 could	provide	the	basis	for	positioning	this	treatment	as	a	form	of	symbolic	violence.	4		As	a	brief	aside,	Pringle’s	attempt	to	problematize	rugby	violence	by	making	a	comparison	to	S&M	also	misses	the	ways	in	which	such	acts	are	a	pleasurable	mimesis	of	‘real’	sexual	and	other	forms	of	interpersonal	violence	(Raj,	2010).			
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